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AMENDMENT OF THE
ABORTION LAW:
RELEVANT DATA AND
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I NTHIS

PAPER I should like to present five points often neglected
or obscured in the presentation to legislatures of arguments bearing on the amendment of statutes on abortion. These five points
are: the present status of medical research on the child in the womb;
the present teaching of tort law in regard to such a child; relevant
constitutional law in regard to such a child; the statistical data on
deaths from abortion; and the nature of the issue you have to resolve.
In presenting this material I intend to contrast the old and the new
in medical research and tort law, and the alleged and the accurate
as to statistics, and to show how these contrasts relate to the constitutional question and the question of changes in the abortion law.

I
The Status of Medical Research on the Child in the Womb
The Old View
The ancient view of the child in the womb was that he was a
part of his mother. This view was enshrined in the Roman law.'
It survived into the twentieth century and was stated as good medicine and good law by the highest court of the state of New York
as comparatively recently as 1921: "When justice or convenience
requires, the child in the womb is dealt with as a human being, although
physiologically it is a part of the mother", Justice Pound wrote
* A.B. 1947, Harvard University; M.A., Ph.D., 1951, Catholic University;
LL.B. Harvard University. John T. Noonan, Jr. is Professor of Law at the
Univ. of California, Berkeley. He is the author of CONTRACEPTION (Harvard
Univ. Press, 1965), and has lectured extensively on abortion and contraception in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Asia.
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for the Court with Justice Cardozo dis2
senting in Drobner v. Peters..
The New View
Enormous scientific developments have
enabled modern men to put aside the
unscientific notion which the Roman law
relied on and which the Court of Appeals
in good faith accepted. The new data
is well set out in the report of a woman
doctor, H. M. I. Liley, who, with her
husband, A. William Liley, was a pioneer
in developing techniques for blood transfusions to the baby in the womb. The
work of these two outstanding fetologists
made it possible for the statement to be
made in 1967:
Because the fetus is benignly protected,
warmed and nourished within the womb,
it was long thought that the unborn must
have the nature of a plant, static in habit
and growing only in size. Recently through
modern techniques of diagnosing and

treating the unborn baby, we have discovered that little could be further from
the truth.
The fluid that surrounds the human
fetus at 3, 4, 5 and 6 months is essen-

tial to both its growth and its grace.
The unborn's structure at this early stage
is highly liquid, and although his organs
have developed, he does not have the
same relative bodily proportions that a
newborn baby has. The head, housing
the miraculous brain, is quite large in
proportion to the remainder of the body
and the limbs are still relatively small.

Within his watery world, however (where
we have been able to observe him in his
natural state by closed circuit x-ray television set), he is quite beautiful and
perfect in his fashion, active and grace-

ful. He is neither an acquiescent vegetable nor a witless tadpole as some have
conceived him to be in the past, but
rather a tiny human being as independent as though he were lying in a crib
with a blanket wrapped around him in3
stead of his mother.
The evidence accumulated by the new
science

of fetology converges with the
understanding of mental growth that has
been made possible by intensive study
of the early life of the child. Here the
testimony of Dr. Arnold Gesell, founder
of the Clinic of Child Development at
Yale University, is of particular significance. In a chapter entitled "The Nature of Mental Growth", Dr. Gesell
points out that from the point of view of
a psychologist, "mental growth is a process of behavior patterning."
He continues:
[e]ven in the limb bud stage, when the
embryo is only four weeks old, there is
evidence of behavior patterning: the
heart beats. In two more weeks slow
back and forth movements of arms and
limbs appear. Before the twelfth week
of uterine life the fingers flex in reflex
4
grasps.
All of this development, detectable as
early as the fourth week, is, in Gesell's
professional view, "mental growth". In
other words mental growth is the organization of nerve cells into patterns of
responsiveness or into what can be called
reaction systems. From the studies of
the child psychologists it can be said that
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this process of mental development which
characterizes the ten-year-old child, or
the one-year-old child, also characterizes
the embryo who is only one month old.
II
The Status of the Child in Tort Law
The Old Law
The common law of torts was set out
in a classic statement by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes holding that there could
be no recovery for the wrongful death of
the child because of injuries inflicted in
the womb-in other words, no recovery
5
for an abortion.
It was this classic statement that Justice Pound followed in the Drobner case,
where he said, "In the mother's womb he
[.the infant] had no separate existence of
his own. He carried the injuries out into
the world with him. His full rights as a
human being sprang into existence with
his birth." I The child's action for negligence resulting in prenatal injury was
dismissed. Only Justice Cardozo prophetically dissented.
The New Law
In 1951 the Court of Appeals decided
that it should no longer follow the
Drobner case. It held that an infant
might sue for injuries inflicted upon him
7
as a child in the womb.
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The reversal of Drobner in 1951 was
only part of what has been aptly called
"the most spectacularly abrupt reversal
of a well settled rule in the whole history
of the law of torts"." That development
occurred in response to the new medical
evidence and in response to the criticisms
of legal writers who said there was no
longer any sense in treating the child in
the womb as a part of the mother.
This development is taken as a prime
example of the effect of scientific development on law in the instructive book of
Professor Edwin W. Patterson of Columbia University Law School. He concludes
"the meaning and scope of even such a
basic term as 'legal person' can be modified by reason of changes in scientific
facts-the unborn child has been recognized as a legal person even in the law
of torts".'
The change in the tort law left undecided whether the child had to be viable
to recover for his injuries and whether
the child had to be born alive in order
to maintain a suit. Here the courts have
not been unanimous, but the modern
trend is clear.
As to viability, the majority of courts
hold that the child need not be viable
at the time of the injury. 19 In a leading
Pennsylvania case Justice Curtis Bok observed, "[v]iability has little to do with
the basic right to recover". He went on
to say, "[tihe real catalyst of the problem
is the current state of medical knowledge

5 Dietrich v. Inhabitants

of Northampton, 138
Mass. 14 (1884).
IDrobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. at 223, 133
N.E. at 568 (1921).
7Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d
691 (1951).
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as to the separate existence of a fetus".
Holding that this question of separate
existence was the key to the problem,
Justice Bok, speaking for the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, allowed recovery
for injury to a fetus who was one month
old at the time of injury.11
There are additional reasons for not
making "viability" the dividing line in the
treatment of the child in the womb as a
person. One is that the perfection of
artificial incubation may make the fetus
viable at any time: it may be removed
and artificially sustained. Experiments
with animals already show that such a
procedure is possible.1 2 This hypothetical
extreme case relates to an actual difficulty: there is considerable elasticity
to the idea of viability. Mere length of
life is not an exact measure. The viability of the fetus depends on the extent of
its anatomical and functional development.1 The weight and length of the
fetus are better guides to the state of its
development than age, but weight and
length vary.14 Moreover, different racial
groups have different ages at which their
fetuses are viable. Some evidence, for
example, suggests that Negro fetuses mature more quickly than Caucasian fetuses."1

I'Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d
93 (1960).
12 Brinster & Thompson, Development of EightCell Mouse

Embryos in

Vitro, 42

EXPERI-

MENTAL CELL RESEARCH 308 (1966).
13 J. MORISON, FETAL & NEONATAL PATHOLOGY

99-100 (1963).
14 Gruenwald, Growth of the Human Fetus, 94
AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1112
(1966).
15 MORISON, supra note 13 at 101.

If viability is the norm, the standard
would vary with race and with many individual circumstances.
The second question where there is
still a split of authority is whether an
action may be brought for the wrongful
death of the child in the womb-in other
words, whether a suit may be brought for
causing an abortion, whether intentionally
or negligently. Here there is some variation depending on the wrongful death
statute involved. The Court of Appeals
has held that an action could not be
brought for the wrongful death of two
twins, stillborn at the age of seven
months due to the negligence of the defendant.6 The court noted that the Decedent Estate Law had been first enacted
in 1847, and that at this time the legislature would not have intended to include
an unborn fetus within the term "decedent" in wrongful actions. The court declined to extend Woods, on the ground
that the fetus who was killed was not
faced with the prospect of impaired
mental or physical health, and so did not
need compensation.
Payment to the
mother who could already recover for
her suffering as a result of the still birth
was characterized as "an unmerited
bounty". The court added that proof of
causation and damages would be "vague".
Judges Burke and Keating made a vigorous dissent.
In contrast to the decision of the Court
of Appeals is the decision by an equally
distinguished court in the case of Torri-

16
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N.Y.2d
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gian v. Watertown News Co. 7 In this
case the intestate was a child 32 months
from the time of conception. He was
killed by a truck negligently striking his
mother. As the court put it, "[tihere was
medical testimony that the accident of
January 2 was the adequate cause of the
premature birth, and that the cause of
death

was

prematurity." '"

Death was

thus caused by one of the classic methods
of abortion-forced premature delivery
of a nonviable fetus, albeit abortion by
motor vehicle is not a classic method.
The court had to decide whether an action in tort lay for such death. Chief
Justice Wilkins remarked, "[w]e are not
impressed with the soundness of the arguments against recovery. They should not
prevail against logic and justice." The
court held that an action would lie for
the abortion of the child which had been
negligently caused by the defendant.
If one accepts the trend of modern
tort cases, one is led to conclude, in the
words of the writers summarized by
Prosser, "the unborn child in the path of
an automobile is as much a person in
the street as the mother"., "
If one does not accept the modern
trend entirely, but takes the position that
the child must survive in order to bring
suit, the requirement of survival to birth
says nothing as to the rights which the
civil law is protecting before birth. The
argument has been made that, because
of the survival requirement, no injury is
recognized by law prior to birth. A com-
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parison with other common-law rules
shows that this argument is fallacious.
The common law, before the enactment
of wrongful death acts, was that if a person were tortiously killed, no suit could
be brought to vindicate his death by civil
damages because "the tort died with
him".2 0 No one ever asserted that the
law did not recognize adult beings as
persons because at common law they had
to survive in order to sue. No one ever
said that an injury was not done by destroying an adult because the law precluded recovery for the wrong.
It is plain that, in recognizing a cause
of action for injury inflicted before birth,
a legal interest and personality are recognized as protected before birth. The birth
itself is not an event which, suddenly
and retroactively, endows the newborn
with rights which a negligent motorist
could have invaded five months before
the child had them. If the child in the
womb is a person in the path of the
automobile, it is because he is a person
at the prenatal moment when the automobile or other agency of injury or death
strikes him.
III
The Status of the Child in
Constitutional Law
The Old Law
There are, so far as I know, no old
cases where the constitutional rights of
the child in the womb were balanced

17352 Mass. 447, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967).
at 448, 225 N.E.2d at 926.
10 PROSSER, supra note 8, § 56 at 355.
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against the freedom of the mother to
exercise her choice and her conscience.
The New Law
Within the last decade the issue of
whether a mother has the right to take
a course of action, in obedience to her
conscience, which will result in the abortion of the child, has been litigated in
two cases. In each, a hospital sought to
give a blood transfusion to the mother
necessary to preserve the life of the child
in the womb, and the mother, as a matter of religious belief, preferred to let the
child die rather than permit the blood
transfusion.
In the first of these cases, In re
Application of President of Georgetown
University Hospital,21 Judge J. Skelly
Wright declared,
The State as parens patriae will not
allow a parent to abandon a child and
so it should not allow this most ultimate
of voluntary abandonments. The mother
had a responsibility to the community
to care for her infant.22
The second case arose in New Jersey
and again set one of the most fundamental of constitutional rights of the mother,
the right to practice her religious belief,
against the life of the child. The New
Jersey court compared the case to one it
had earlier decided where the blood transfusion was given after the birth of the
baby. The court composed of Chief
Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs,

21331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 978 (1964).
22ld. at 1008.

Francis, Hall, Schettino, and Hanneman
found no difference between this case
and the case now presented of a fetus
likely to be aborted if denied blood. It
declared in a unanimous per curiam opinion, "[w]e are satisfied that the unborn
child is entitled to the law's protection.
• . . We have no difficulty in so deciding
with respect to the infant child." 23
It is noteworthy that in both cases the
Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the decision denying the
mother's right to permit the abortion of
her child.
It seems to be evident that if the courts
hold that the interest in the life of the
child is above that of even the right of a
woman to practice her religion, the right
of the child is above every other right of
the mother except her right to life itself.
In the case where a choice must be made
between the life of the mother and the
life of the child, the state is incapable of
forcing the choice, and the ordinary rules
of self-defense come into play. Where
the interest of the mother is less than
that of life, the child's fundamental right
to life has been respected.
Given this recognition of the constitutional right of the child in the womb to
protection, it seems established by analogy that to remove the protection of the
criminal law from the child in the womb
would be itself an unconstitutional act.
The civil rights cases have established
that for the government to fail to protect

Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied,
377 U.S. 985 (1964).
23
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a class is itself an unconstitutional denial
of civil rights. As the Fifth Circuit said,
"[t]here was a time when the denial of
equal protection of the laws was confined
to affirmative acts, but the law now is
that culpable official inaction will constitute a denial of equal protection." "'
The child in the womb is capable of
having only one civil right-the right to
life itself. To deny that right by depriving him of safeguards against those who
would take it from him is an unconstitutional invasion of his right. As the Supreme Court of the United States declared in holding unconstitutional a statute which permitted the permanent
sterilization of certain persons, "[t]here is
no redemption for the individual whom
the law touches." 25 If the civil right of
the child in the womb is stripped from
him, there is no redemption for him if
his destruction is then effected.
IV
Statistics
Much of the argument for a change in
the abortion laws-and by implication
much of the constitutional justification
for such a change-is that the present
laws produce a high maternal mortality
and that the present laws are contrary
to the practices of a large part of the
community. It is assumed or stated that
a change in the abortion laws would sub-

Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479
(5th Cir. 1951).
25Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).

stantially reduce maternal mortality and
would substantially. reduce the number of
acts of abortion performed in defiance of
community standards as determined by
law. Both of these arguments rest on
some statistics. I should like to examine
this data.
Alleged Statistics on Maternal
Mortality
In California two years ago, in the
drive to induce the California Legislature
to change its law, the most popular
pamphlet used by the proponents for
change was entitled "Must Ten Thousand
Women Die Each Year?" The implication of this title was that every year in
the United States 10,000 women died as
a result of criminal abortions. This figure
was quoted often in newspaper editorials
in California in support of the campaign
for change. The figure of 10,000 survived as recently as September of 1967,
as it was quoted in an editorial in The
Washington Post of September 2 urging
change in the American abortion laws in
order to reduce maternal mortality of
this drastic kind.
Mt. Zad Leavy was active in the campaign for the changes in California in
association with his partner, Senator
Beilenson. Now, in a brief presented to
the Supreme Court of California in the
pending case of People v. Belous, he has
presented a brief in which the authority
he cites estimates that 5,000 women die
each year from criminal abortions.2 6 In
this same brief Mr. Leavy declares,

24

26 Brief on behalf of certain doctors as Amicus
Curiae at 11, People v. Belous, Criminal No.
12739.
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It is no less than shocking to realize that
every week of every month of every
year approximately ten women lose their
lives in California because these anachronistic laws drive them away from surgically safe procedures and into the hands
of criminals to avoid giving birth to un27
wanted children.
Accurate Statistics
Is there any basis for these statistics
-for the 10,000 a year figure so often
popularly used, or the figure Mr. Leavy
quotes of 5,000 or the 500 a year he
says is true of California? The person
who is in the best position to answer that
question is Dr. Christopher Tietze, Associate Medical Director of the Biomedical
Division of the Population Council, the
world authority on the statistics of abortion in all parts of the world, and himself
an advocate of some forms of abortion.
Referring to the enormous figures of
10,000 and 5,000, Dr. Tietze has declared without qualification that such
figures for the United States are "unmitigated nonsense." 2s
How many maternal deaths are actually caused by any form of abortion? The
known number of deaths per year is
about 250. At the most,'Dr. Tietze says,
there may be 500 maternal deaths each
year due to abortion.
There is something wrong with an
argument, I suggest, where the alleged
statistics needed to make it's point have
been increased by 2,000 percent above
what the experts say are the best estimates.
The same observation may be made
of the California statistics as to which
27
2s

Id.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1967, at 38, col. I.

Mr. Leavy professed his shock that every
week of every month ten women lose
their lives due to criminal abortionists.
Actually, an exhaustive study of the total
number of maternal deaths over a period
of recent years in California established
that the number of maternal deaths from
all abortions, legal and criminal, was on
the average of 30 per year. 9 Here again
in behalf of his argument Mr. Leavy had
presented statistics which had been increased almost 2,000 percent above the
best estimates of the experts.
Alleged Statistics on the Number of
Criminal Abortions
The number of abortions that criminally occur in the United States or in a particular state has been the subject of much
mystification. How many criminal abortions actually occur annually in the United States or in the state of New York?
The only answer that seems to me that
can be reasonably given is, "[w]e do not
know how many occur." The act is not
only criminal, but, unlike crimes such as
larceny, its perpetration is secret and, if
it is successful, its accomplishment remains a secret. It is not easily subject
to statistical survey. It becomes a matter
of guesswork and extrapolation from very
fragmentary bits of information.
A conference held in 1958 under the
sponsorship of the Planned Parenthood
Association of America gathered experts
on abortion and asked them to make
their estimates of the number of criminal
abortions in America. The range of

2

Fox, Abortion Deaths in California, 98 AM.
& GYNECOLOGY 645 (1967).
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guesses by the experts was from 200,000
to 1,000,000 abortions annually. 3 When
you are in doubt by a magnitude of 600
percent, you do not know the answer.
An estimate of abortions under the unamended English law was made by an
English expert on the basis of figures of
Assuming
known maternal mortality.
as
was
a
serious
operation
that abortion
a result of which there would be inevitably a certain percentage of maternal
deaths from its performance, he was able
to form an estimate of the number of
actual criminal abortions in England.
The figure he reached was that of 10,000
criminal abortions a year. 3 If the English experience is a good guide to
American experience, there might, then,
be between 40,000 and 50,000 criminal
abortions annually in the United States.
Is there any rational basis by which
one can choose between 40,000 annual
abortions or 200,000 or 1,000,000 as the
correct figures for the United States? I
have not seen any evidence or method
proposed by which a rational choice
could be made between these conflicting
guesses.
The Significance of the Argument
from Statistics
One stated or implicit argument of
those relying on the maternal death statistics is that a change in the abortion
laws would reduce the number of maternal deaths. It might be felt that if
even 250 maternal deaths in the Unit-

30
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ed States are caused by criminal abortions, that is too many. There is, however, no certainty that any change in
the abortion laws would reduce this sort
of death. The figures sometimes cited
from the Communist countries of Eastern
Europe depend on an attitude toward
abortion and techniques which might not
be acceptable in the United States. If we
take the attitude toward abortion prevailing in a democratic society such as Sweden which accepts licensed abortion, abortion is a serious operation which is regulated by the State. If we look at the
Swedish experience, which represents the
best example of state controlled abortion
in a Western democratic society, the maternal death rate over a period of 20
years from licensed abortions in Swedish
hospitals has been slightly higher than
the death rate from actual delivery of a
child. 3 2 As Swedish medicine is not inferior to American medicine, there is
little reason to suppose that procedures
in American hospitals would be more
successful in reducing maternal mortality
than procedures in Swedish hospitals.
The other argument based on statistics
is that the number of abortions criminally performed show a rejection of the law
by large segments of the community. To
that argument there are two answers:
. If the law is as ineffective as
claimed, there would not now be such
strong pressure by those who disagree
with the law, to effect its repeal.
2. The laws against theft were violated in 1966 by 762,352 cases of larceny
of amounts over $50 known to the police

STATES 186 (1958).

31Goodhart, The Frequency of Illegal Abortion, 55 EUGENICS REV. 199 (1964).

3. Klintsog,

Operationsriskerna vid legal abort,

1954 ABORTFRAGEN 30 (1954).
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and 486,568 cases of auto theft known
to the police."3
Unlike the case of abortion where we
are guessing with an enormous range in
the guesses, we have a known pattern of
behavior which has produced criminal
acts of which the police are aware:
1,248,920 violations of the laws against
theft. Does anyone argue from this
enormous number of violations that there
is something wrong with our laws on larceny, that the real trouble is with the
victims whose property is taken, that we
should reform the laws on larceny to accommodate contemporary moral standards?
It seems fair to say that the only time
that persons use statistics of law violations to urge the repeal of the law is
when for very different reasons they have
already rejected the values preserved and
protected by the law.
Finally, on the significance of statistics,
it is well to point out that the Swedish
experience did show that unless one repealed all the abortion laws there would
be no substantial reduction in the number of abortions. In Sweden, which has
the longest experience in regulated abortions in Western Europe, there is no evidence that the criminal abortions, estimated at 20,000 a year when the 1938
act was passed, have been substantially
reduced by the Swedish laws licensing
34
abortion in a number of circumstances.

3 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

STATISTICAL AB-

STRACT OF THE U.S. 149 (1967).

MUhrus, Some Aspects of the Swedish Law
Governing Termination of Pregnancy, THE
LANCET 1292 (1964).

V
The Nature of the Issue
Presented with testimony from several
sides, a choice has to be made to reject
all requests for change, to adopt a radical
change, or to compromise. In the nature
of the political process, one may well be
inclined to compromise on a set of modest changes. It seems to me that this
course, however appealing in the ordinary case where political or economic interests are at stake, is not possible where
this kind of legislation involving basic
civil rights including the right to life, is
involved.
If a law is adopted which is tailored
to meet the cases that have the most
emotional appeal when they are presented by themselves without reference to the
larger problems-the cases of rape, incest, and mental instability-a major step
has been taken towards abandoning the
state's right to protect the fetus. This is
no mere logical fear; it is actually what
is now happening in California. I should
like to quote again from the brief of Mr.
Leavy in the Belous case attacking the
constitutionality of any state regulation
of abortion:
In the Therapeutic Abortion Act of
1967, the State demonstrated that it was
not concerned with protecting the embryo. In this Act, the State recognizes
the woman's interest as overriding any
interest in the embryo, for it allows a
woman to terminate a pregnancy which
will cause her great social and psychological distress. Health & Safety Code
§ 25951 (abortion for rape or incest).
With the incest provision, the State allows a woman to abort a pregnancy that
occurred through her voluntary sexual
activity, for if it were not voluntary the

15
rape provision would govern the case.
Under these provisions, then, the State
disclaims its interest in the "life" of the
embryo and allows the woman and her
doctor

to determine whether she

35
have an abortion.

shall

Mr. Leavy concludes his argument by
saying, "[t]he statute denies equal protection of the laws" to all those women who
cannot get abortions at their will. Half
measures place a state in the same position that Mr. Leavy contends the State
of California has placed itself.
The choice, then, is between resisting
the pressure for any change or, alternatively, permitting, in one guise or another,
abortion on demand. If you choose the
second course, you will have added one
more serious, divisive tension to a community which is already riven by deep
lines of division. You will have stripped,
in part or in whole, protection from beings which a substantial number of citizens consider as entitled to the protection
of the laws as they themselves are. Indeed, a survey of opinion of those engaged in public health work professionally has shown that half of this small
professional group believe that the child
before birth is a human being.36 You
will have taken from the child in the
womb a protection which other human
beings claim as the most basic of civil
rights.

brief supra note. 26.
Knutson, When Does a Human Life Begin:
Viewpoint of Public Health Professionals, 57
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 2167 (1967).
35 See
3e
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Those who accept the essential humanity of the fetus cannot sit back and say
this is a case where each one can follow
his conscience or do his own thing. Accepting the fact that what is involved is
the life of a child, they must regard it as
their duty to prevent other people from
destroying the child, even if those other
people are the ones who brought the
child into existence. The child is not the
property of his parents.
The attitude of peacefully accepting
the destruction of the rights of others has
been much criticized in regard to the attitude of many persons in Germany under
the Nazi regime and many persons in
America in regard to civil rights for Negroes in earlier times. The lesson one
must draw from those historical experiences is that those who see the civil rights
of others being destroyed by withdrawal
of protection of the laws have the strongest of civic obligations to insist that every
part of the community is entitled to the
protection of the laws. The issue is a
fighting one. By that I mean, that there
can be no compromise, no tolerance, no
easy acceptance of legislation which destroys the most basic of human and civil
rights for a class of children.
If you choose to resist all pleas and
pressures for change, you will have the
consciousness that you are acting in accordance with what is the converging
testimony of those who have studied the
life of the child in the womb both physiologically and psychologically.
You
will have the consciousness that you are
keeping the protection afforded by the
criminal law in harmony with the newlyemergent protection now given by the law
of torts. You will have the consciousness
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of following the path indicated by those
courts which have considered the constitutional rights of the mother in relation
to the constitutional right of the child to
live.
Finally, you will be conscious that you
are acting not only in harmony with the
great body of recent medical and legal
data, but in harmony with informed world
opinion. Only ten years ago the United
Nations adopted a "Declaration of the
Rights of the Child" which supplemented
the United Nations' statement entitled the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights".
One reason for this supplementary declaration was stated in its Preamble as
being because "the child, by reason of
his physical and mental immaturity, needs
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well
as after birth". 37 Thus the representatives
of most of the civilized nations of the
world recognized that the being before
birth deserved recognition as a "child".
They further recognized that a child, so
defined, needed legal protection. The
committee report on this declaration noted that "representatives of the most diametrically-opposed social systems find
common ideals and aspirations in discussing the privileges of childhood". 3 8 The
committee thus underlined that the rights
asserted by the United Nations as applic-

3 General Assembly of the United Nations,
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted
unanimously in the plenary meeting of Nov.
20, 1959. 14 U.N. Gen. Assembly Off. Record
19-20 (1959).
38 Rept. of the Third Comm. of the Gen.
Assembly, 14 U.N. Gen. Assembly Off. Record
593.

able to the fetus represented a commitment which had commended itself to all
of the various social systems represented
within that worldwide body.
Thus, the civilized world has treated
the child before birth in the same way as
the child after birth. In enumerating the
10 principles which constituted the rights
of the child including the child in the
womb, the United Nations declared, "[t]he
child shall in all circumstances be among
the first to receive protection and relief"
(Principle 8). The United Nations further said, "[t]he child shall be protected
against all forms of neglect, cruelty and
exploitation" (Principle 9). Above all,
the United Nations affirmed that the child
"shall be entitled to grow and develop in
health; to this end, special care and protection shall be provided both to him and
to his mother, including adequate prenatal and postnatal care" (Principle 4).
If the child is to be "among the first", if
the child is not to be subjected to neglect
or to cruelty, if the child is to receive
prenatal care, then the child's life cannot
be taken at the will of the child's mother.
The present law of New York which protects by the criminal sanctions of homicide
39
the "unborn child" of six months or more,
became effective September 1, 1967. It
protects the unborn child under six months
40
by the "related offense" of abortion.
There is no reason in either contemporary
law or medicine to change these modem
protections established to defend the
right to life of the child in the womb.

a9 N.Y. PENAL LAW-§ 125.00 (McKinney Supp.
1968),.
401d. at § 125.05.

